Throughout several decades, face has been variously defined as positive or negative (Brown and Levinson 1987), respectability, identity, individual, group (Spencer-Oatey 2005), mianzi and lian. (Mao 1994, Chen 1991). Despite claims for the universality of face, there would appear to be no general agreement as to its precise nature. Variations have been identified in the ways that different languages and cultures strive to maintain face in every day encounters. In particular, striking differences have been pointed out in the strategies used in the English and Chinese acts of complimenting (Tian and Zhao 2006), addressing (Gu 1990), offering (Chen 1991, Spencer-Oatey 2005) and inviting (Mao1994). I shall endeavour to demonstrate how various ‘faces’ might account for these different strategies.

 Defining face

Goffman (1955) introduced a concept of face, which he defined as;

“the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact.” (p213)

He uses the term, face-work (p216) to describe the actions people take to save their own face (defensive orientation) and that of others (protective orientation). According to Goffman, there are two face-saving processes involved in face work. The “avoidance process” that is avoiding threats to face (p217) and the “corrective process” (p218) where participants resolve the threat to face.

Brown & Levinson (1987) developed this concept further. However, they considered face to exist in two forms: negative face, which is a “basic claim to territories, personal preserves, freedom of action and freedom from imposition”. (p61) and positive face or “a positive, consistent self image which includes the desire to be appreciated and approved of”. (p61). More simply; negative face is the want that actions be unimpeded and positive face is the want that wants be desirable to at least some others (p62)

Although Goffman identified only three kinds of threat to face, Brown and Levinson’s term “Face Threatening Act” applies to any speech act, which may threaten either negative or positive face.

These acts may be threats to the addressee;

orders, suggestions, requests, warnings etc               (negative face threats)

disapproval, criticism, contradiction                               (positive face threats)

or threats to the speaker;

 thanking, minimising hearers debt, transgression      (negative face threats)

apology, acceptance of compliment, confession etc   (positive face threats)                                                                           (p65-8)

Brown and Levinson propose, that Politeness in speech is the speaker’s use of  redressive strategies to mitigate the effects of Face Threatening Acts and can be subdivided into positive and negative forms.

Positive Politeness is a redress directly to the addressee’s positive face. It can be  achieved by claiming common ground, conveying that speaker and hearer are co-operators or by fulfilling the hearers want for something.

Negative Politeness is a redress to the addressee’s negative face. To achieve negative politeness, the speaker must not coerce the hearer nor impose upon his personal space. The speaker must also communicate his own want not to impinge upon the hearer.

Objections to Brown and Levinson

In the years since Brown and Levinson, authors from varying cultural backgrounds, have challenged their work. In particular, their claim to universality has been called into question. Some have complained that Brown and Levinson’s work is culturally biased towards Europe and the western world. Brown and Levinson have received criticism especially from oriental linguists such as Ide (1989) and Matsumoto (1988) who point out that, in certain cultures, and in particular, their native Japanese, the larger social group to which the individual belongs is of greater importance than the individual, himself. In this case, they argue, the division of face into negative and positive is not appropriate since this is a feature of a western individualist approach to politeness.

Moreover, Brown and Levinson’s face-work is performed by speakers and hearers of equal status who are free to choose from a wide range of linguistic strategies. In contrast with this, the Japanese speaker’s politeness behaviour is dictated by social positions and relationships between speaker and hearer. Language forms are limited to the use of specific honorific forms that indicate the relative status of the speaker and the addressee. 

Ide uses the term volition to describe the individual’s freedom to choose whether to be polite. In Japan, the individual owes allegiance to the social group, from whence, Ide and Matsumoto assert, the individual acquires his/her status (face?) This they call discernment – The speaker is not at liberty to exercise personal choice and must adhere to what Watts (2003) calls “socially appropriate strategies of interaction”. (p82).

Ide also uses the Japanese word, “wakimae”, which she says is the practice of polite behaviour according to social conventions.

 “To behave according to wakimae is to show verbally one’s sense of place or role in a given situation according to social conventions” (p230)

In Japan then, politeness is inseparable from the language and, according to Eelen (2001) it is through the language that; “socio-structural concordance is achieved.” (p12)

Similarly, Gu (1990) demonstrates why Brown and Levinson’s model does not fit easily with the Chinese conception of politeness. In particular, Gu objects to the notion of negative face. He points out, that Brown and Levinson’s face-threatening acts may not be face-threatening to a Chinese hearer. This is especially noticeable for example, in offers and invitations which, though considered a threat to the negative face of a European, would not seem so in Chinese.

Gu maintains that to view face merely as wants is to consider only the instrumental aspect of politeness. He points out that what he calls a normative function of politeness is exercised in the Chinese context (p242). According to Gu, the Chinese politeness, limao, has four underlying notions; respectfulness, modesty, attitudinal warmth, and refinement. (p239) On the basis of these he formulates a number of maxims which though reminiscent of Leech (1983), are more suitable to Chinese and together, constitute his  politeness principle which, he says, can be understood as a sanctioned belief, that an individual’s social behaviour ought to live up to the four underlying notions of limao. (p245)

Other Chinese scholars (eg Chen 1991, Mao 1994) have pointed out that the English word  face is represented in Chinese, by two words: Mianzi is associated with prestige, power, reputation and social status. It can be given to another individual by enhancing that person’s standing or simply making the person look good in front of others. Similarly, mianzi would be lost if an individual were to fall on hard times, be demoted, or made to look foolish. Lian however is more closely associated with the society’s moral code. It is the respect that one gains by being of good character, and adhering to moral standards. Lian cannot be given but has to be earned by virtue of one’s conduct. Nevertheless, lian can be lost through immoral conduct such as adultery, prostitution, or by virtue of having been in prison. The English word shame seems to relate very closely to lian. That is to say, a person who is regarded as shameless would probably also not have lian.

Mao (1994) identifies two major differences between Chinese face and western face. The first is the public self-image, which only concerns the individuals wants and desires (p459) Mao asserts that;

“Chinese face encodes a reputable image that individuals can claim for themselves as they interact with others in a given community. Chinese face emphasizes not the accommodation of individual “wants” or “desires” but the  harmony of individual conduct with the views and judgement of the community” (p460)

Secondly, Mao maintains that mianzi cannot be properly understood in terms of negative face. Whereas negative face refers to “an individual’s need to be free of external impositions” (p460), to gain mianzi is to win recognition “not so much of one’s claim to freedom of action as to the respect or prestige of the community.” Though it is not systematically encoded in the language, Chinese lian, according to Mao, resembles the Japanese wakimae in that it “observes status differences and social interdependence” (p469)

In Mao’s view, face is not the “sole prerogative of the individual”. He argues, as Goffman did, that face is public property and is merely on loan to the individual, who must act in a way that is worthy of it (Mao p469, Goffman p215). Mao identifies a family resemblance between Chinese and Japanese in that, both lay claim to an image “in accordance with values and perceptions that are defined by society” (p469). However, this is neither new nor exclusively oriental. It was, in fact, identified in Goffman’s definition of face as a self-image that is “delineated in terms of approved social attributes.” (p213).

Spencer-Oatey (2005) uses the term rapport management to describe the way that interpersonal relations may be enhanced, neglected, challenged or maintained. (p96). She draws a distinction between what she sees as two fundamental types of face. One of these is respectability face that she describes as pan-situational and incorporates the Chinese notions of mianzi and lian in that it  “refers to prestige, honor or “good name” that a person or social group holds and claims within a (broader) community”(p102). The other type of face is identity face which, like Goffman’s is situation-specific. Spencer-Oatey likens it to Goffman’s conception of face but with the addition of claims to social group membership.

Spencer-Oatey sees face not only as individual but, also as a group-based phenomenon (p106). The individual derives group face from his membership of the group, which may be as small as a family, or on the scale of an ethnic, national or religious group (p106). She points out that group face and individual face may be interconnected and, depending on the context, one or the other may take prominence. In team sports, for example, an individual player may score a goal and maintain or enhance their personal standing whilst at the same time reinforcing group face and the sense of belonging. This too, is reminiscent of Goffman’s view of face as a shared image such that a person may “make a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself” (p213).

Spencer-Oatey’s use of the term wants (p107) differs from Brown and Levinson in that it refers to the goals that people may have in their interactions. These goals are of two types: Transactional, where a specific task is to be achieved, or relational such as peace making, currying favour or promoting friendship. As she points out, the two may be interconnected when for example, the successful management of a relational goal is necessary in order that a transactional goal may be achieved. For example, the transactional goal of securing the release of a hostage may depend upon the successful relational goal of establishing a dialogue with the captor.

Besides agreeing with Goffman and Mao that face is only on loan from society (p251), Locher (2006) views face not as constant but as unstable and continually renegotiated. The speaker could adopt more than one role and might wish to make use of several different faces.

Like Watts (2003), She proposes that no act is inherently polite, but is assessed using previously acquired “social norms of appropriateness” (p250) to determine what is perceived to be “positively marked” (polite) and “negatively marked” (impolite) behaviour. She also maintains that besides these, there exists behaviour, which is neither positively nor negatively marked but “merely appropriate to the interaction in question”.

Locher rejects the notion of face-work simply as a description of the mitigation of face threatening acts. Instead, she proposes that polite behaviour is part of the relational work that individuals invest in negotiating relationships and is inherent in all human social interaction. Locher’s relational work differs from face-work in that it comprises not only mitigation of face threatening acts, but covers;

“the entire spectrum of behaviour, from rude and impolite, via normal, appropriate and unmarked, to marked and polite” (p250)

Face and Place

Yanagiya (1999) classifies the treatment of face in three major categories. The Face-only view such as that proposed by Brown and Levinson, where politeness is seen as  “an activity serving to enhance, maintain or protect the face” (p43), the Place-only view of Matsumoto (1988) where face has no part to play in politeness, and the Face and place view which is favoured by Yanagiya who further subcategorises it thus:

Face embracing place - accepts the concept of face but allows for cultural variations. (e.g. Mao 1994, Goffman 1955)

place before face - complements face by the addition of a discernment component. (e.g. Ide 1989)

The face and place view is also consistent with Watts (1989). Underlying his work is the distinction between restricted and elaborated codes proposed by Bernstein (1971) which he associates with what he calls open and closed communication. In a closed communication group, the collective needs of the entire group are considered to be of greater importance than the individual’s own interests. In contrast, the open communication group is one where the individual’s interests take priority. The terms volition and discernment, as used by Ide (1989) relate to this. Watts describes discernment as the “almost automatic observation of socially-agreed-upon rules”, (p132), and cultures such as Japan and China, where this is practised, he describes as closed. On the other hand, Volition cultures such as America and Sweden, where the speaker is motivated by “considerations of cost and benefit (cf Leech 1983) and face (cf Brown and Levinson 1978)” (p132), are regarded as open.

Nevertheless, Watts (2003) believes that any sociocultural group is likely to have features of both discernment and volition but to varying degrees.

”We are not faced with a dichotomous distinction here between volitional politeness and discernment politeness, but rather with a spectrum of possibilities ranging from the two extremes of discernment and volition along which societies might be ranged and within which individuals from those societies might show further individual variation.” (p83)

Mao proposes that “Anglo-American” face and Japanese / Chinese face differ because of their underlying forces. According to Mao, the underlying force of Anglo-American face is “centrifugal” because it,

“spirals outward from individual desires or wants, and see the self as the initiating agent”

The underlying force of Chinese and Japanese face, on the other hand, is described as centripetal because it;

“Gravitates toward social recognition and hierarchical interdependence.”

Mao suggests, that these two opposing forces can be accounted for by what he calls“ relative face orientation” Each of these forces represents an underlying direction of face that aspires to one or the other of “ the ideal social identity, or the ideal individual autonomy” (p472). The relative face orientation of communities such as the Chinese and Japanese, who value group harmony more highly than individual autonomy, would aspire to the ideal social identity, whereas the Anglo-American orientation, which places a greater emphasis on the individual’s freedom from imposition and the desire to be left alone, would aspire to the ideal individual autonomy.

Like Watts, Mao concedes that these opposing forces may co-exist to varying degrees in the same cultural/linguistic group.

“Although one expects to encounter some kind of predominance of one ideal over the other in a given community, the other ‘eclipsed’ ideal does not always remain in the background, and it may, whenever appropriate, be represented, in varying degrees, in some discourse activities within the same community.” (p472)

Mao and Watts gain support from a comparison of Japanese and American-English speakers. Hill et al. (1986) demonstrated that discernment and volition were common factors in the politeness strategies of both groups. However, there was a marked difference in the weighting that the different groups placed upon each factor. Hill et al. suggest that for the Japanese, discernment is obligatory and primary but volition is optional and secondary. That is to say, linguistic choices may be made but only after the speaker has first assessed the relative status of himself and the addressee. For American English speakers both volition and discernment are obligatory but discernment is relegated to secondary status. American speakers must first choose the level of politeness and then assess the relevant factors. They conclude that, although volition and discernment are both universal features of politeness, the order and options of each are language specific. (p362)

Politic and Polite Behaviour

Watts (1989) takes the view that besides polite behaviour there is also, what he calls “politic behaviour” which he defines as;

“…. socio-culturally determined behaviour directed towards the goal of establishing and/or maintaining in a state of equilibrium the personal relationships between the individuals of a social group” (p135)

 

Besides “conventionalised strategies for maintaining face” as proposed by Brown and Levinson, politic behaviour also includes “highly codified honorific language usage based on socially-agreed upon rules of politeness” (p136) that is the “discernment” or “wakimae” described by Ide (1989).

Although politic behaviour is not necessarily polite, politeness should nevertheless, be regarded as a subset of politic behaviour. To Watts, any appropriate behaviour is politic. Deviations from this are either inappropriate, and therefore not politic, or else they are more than merely appropriate and therefore polite. Eelen (2001) describes this as “Ego goes the extra mile so that Alter will have a better-than-average impression of him” (p73)

Watts (1989) and Locher (2006) both agree that what is regarded as polite by one sociocultural group may not be regarded as such by another. Locher points out that a particular utterance may not be perceived as polite even by individuals involved in the interaction (p252). Both speaker and addressee may have differing opinions of what is or is not polite.

 “… a speaker may very well aim at using politeness strategies, but there is no guarantee that the recipient will recognise this intention. p253)

Although Watts believes that politic behaviour is universal, he concedes that;

“what is conventionally polite in one socio-cultural setting may not be in another.” (p135)
Accounting for everyday transactions in Mandarin and English

Complimenting.

Tian and Zhao’s (2006) claim, that modesty is a universally accepted way to be polite, is supported by Leech’s Modesty Maxim (Leech 1983) and Gu’s Self-Denigration Maxim (Gu 1990). However, the modesty is manifested in different ways by Chinese and English speakers.

When told, “That dress looks nice on you” a native English-speaking hearer detects the possibility of a threat to the speaker’s positive face and avoids this by showing appreciation of the compliment. She would probably reply with a customary (obligatory?) “Thank you”  She may even go the extra mile (Eelen 2001) and  utter something like  “How kind of you to notice” Thus making the politic response into a polite one (Watts 1989 ) and enhancing the addressee’s positive face still further. To the Chinese hearer, on the other hand, simply to accept a compliment, no matter how graciously, would be immodest and might constitute a threat to face (mianzi).

A Chinese speaker, when told, “Your English is very good” would enhance his face (mianzi) by belittling his achievement and thus showing modesty. A typically Chinese response would be “Not good, not good” and perhaps followed by “Ni tai guo jiang le!” which   translates as “You over-praise too much” (Cowie et al. 1995) and is probably close in meaning to the English “You flatter me”

Introducing

Introductions in English and Chinese also demonstrate a fundamental difference in politeness strategies. In an English speaking culture, privacy is far more highly regarded than in the Chinese. Gu’s example (p246) of an interaction between two Chinese speakers, demonstrates his maxim of denigrating self and elevating other. Each speaker in turn, devalues his own name and expresses respect for the other’s. This could also be interpreted as enhancing mianzi by one’s own modesty and enhancing the hearer’s mianzi, by maximising praise to the other (Leech 1983).

One clear difference between this and a similar exchange between English speakers, is pointed out by Gu (1990) who, notes that, whereas the Chinese speaker first asks the name of the other and waits to be asked for his own, an English speaker would be more likely to begin by giving his own name and then asking for the name of the hearer. For the English speaker, to do as the Chinese do, and request the hearer’s name, would probably be regarded as a threat to negative face because it impinges on the hearer’s privacy. This is avoided by first giving one’s own name and allowing the hearer the opportunity to reciprocate. The Chinese, in contrast, is taking the first chance to elevate/praise/give face (mianzi) to the hearer.

Offers and Invitations.

A number of authors (Mao 1994, Gu 1990, Chen 1991) have pointed to the very different ways, in which Chinese and English make and accept offers and invitations. The fundamental difference in the English and Chinese interactions has much to do with the different values that each culture places on the individual. The English negative face is threatened by a lack of due respect to an individual’s liberty, rights and independence. In the case of offers and invitations, the English addressee’s negative face is under threat by this intrusion into his personal freedom.

This is what appears to happen in an episode that Chen recorded during the course of a meal in a restaurant in Taiwan. (Chen 1990, p109): (see appendix)

After the seventh course has arrived, the host presses the guest to take more food, so enhancing his own positive face and threatening the guest’s negative face.

The guest declines the offer in order to protect his negative face while at the same time threatening the host’s positive face.

Then begins the ritual battle of politeness. Both host and guest intensify the face threats by offering and declining and each accuses the other of being too polite until, at last, the guest gives in and accepts the offer, while still protesting that the offer is too generous and that the host is too polite.

However, this is a western analysis of the observed behaviour, portraying the pushy host imposing upon an unwilling and ungrateful guest. It has already been pointed out (Gu 1990, Mao 1994) that, to the Chinese, offers and invitations are not considered threats to negative face. According to Tian and Zhao (2006), to the Chinese, offering and inviting demonstrate goodwill on the part of both participants. Personal freedom from imposition gives way to mutual benefit of both participants.

In Chinese culture, it is usual to make and decline an offer/invitation as many as three times before it is accepted. Indeed an offer/ invitation that is not issued a second time would be regarded as insincere and an immediate acceptance of an offer/invitation would probably be considered greedy and certainly impolite. In Chen’s example quoted above, both host and guest are actually striving to maintain their own and the other’s face (mianzi).

1)         The host’s offer of food, by showing generosity, enhances his own face. By his offer, he demonstrates the worthiness of the guest who thereby also gains face.

2)         The guest’s face is maintained when she declines the offer. This proves that she is not greedy. In declining the offer, she tells the host that she cannot eat any more. This confirms that the host has fed his guest well and so, the host’s face benefits。

3)         The host gains face by repeating the offer and gives face by elevating his guest “You’re the most important guest tonight”

4)         The guest enhances host’s face by repeating that she has had enough and           enhances her own face when she tells the host to eat more.

5)         The host’s persistent offering continues to maintain his own and the guest’s face.

(6)        The host’s insistence has established that the offer is genuine. The guest’s continued refusal has confirmed that she is not greedy and it is now safe for her to accept the offer. Both have emerged without suffering any detriment to face and a mutually satisfactory outcome has been achieved.

Conclusion

 Although politeness has been debated by linguists and others for several decades, there would seem to be no general agreement on its precise nature. Watts (1989) even suggests that the concept of politeness itself; “needs to be redefined from culture to culture”. (p132). Nevertheless, almost everybody would seem to agree that it has much to do with the preservation of interpersonal harmony, maintaining a state of equilibrium (Watts 1989), managing rapport (Spencer-Oatey 2006).

 Of the various ways in which to achieve this, one in particular, has stood the test of time. The concept of ‘face’ has been challenged, modified, augmented and expanded but not yet abandoned. Indeed, features first proposed in the 1950s have continued to be revived in later studies. Although, its precise nature may vary from one culture to another, the concept of face can be shown to account very well for every day transactions at least in English and in Mandarin.

 Appendix

a) Translated transcript of an episode recorded by Victoria Chen

Taken from Chen, V., (1991) Mien Tze at the Chinese dinner table: A study of the interactional accomplishment of face, Research on Language and Social Interaction, 24, 109 – 140

 1 Host     Eat more? Come on; don’t be ‘ keqi’ …. Have some more food, please have more….

2 Guest  No, thanks, I’ve eaten a lot already, really, thank you; I can’t eat any more….

3 Host     Come on, more, just a bit more. You’re the most important guest tonight …. So ‘keqi’ …. How come eat so little?

                         (meanwhile rotating the Lazy Susan so that the new dish is in front of the guest)

4 Guest  No, it’s enough, really, really …. I’m not being ‘keqi’; eat more yourself.

                         (rotating the Lazy Suzan back so that the new dish is facing the host)

5 Host     (with enthusiasm): Come on, don’t be ‘keqi’, you can afford to eat more … You ate too little. Just a bit more….

               (rotating the Lazy Susan again)

6 Guest  Alright, just a bit more …Thank you; too much food, so ‘keqi’

 

                                                                                                                          (p109)

 
b)  Transcript of introduction dialogue between Mainland Chinese and Singapore Chinese.

 

Taken from Gu, Y., (1990) Politeness phenomena in Modern Chinese, Journal of Pragmatics 14, 237 – 257

 

[1] M:      nin guixing?                 您贵姓             M:        Your precious surname?

[2]  S:       xiaodi xing Li.             小弟 姓郦        S:        Little brothers surname is  Li.

[3]            nin zunxing?              您 尊姓                        Your respectable surname?

[4]  M:      jianxing Zhang.           贱姓 章            M:        My worthless surname is  Zhang.

                                                                                                                                    (p246)